The decision of the Committee against Torture of August 14, 2017 in the case of G.I. v. Denmark (communication No. 625/2014).
In 2014, the author of the communication was assisted in preparing a complaint. Subsequently, the complaint was communicated to Denmark.
Subject of the message: deportation to Pakistan.
Substantive issue: inadmissibility of forced return; risk of torture upon return to the country of origin.
The Committee's legal position: The Committee recalls that, although the complainant has an obligation to provide convincing evidence in support of his application for asylum, this does not relieve the State party from having to make significant efforts to determine whether there are grounds to believe that the complainant would be in danger of being subjected to torture if returned (paragraph 8.8 of the Decision) (See K.H. v. Denmark, paragraph 8.8; and F.K. v. Denmark, paragraph 7.6.).
The Committee's assessment of the factual circumstances of the case: The Committee must assess whether there are serious grounds to believe that the complainant would be in personal danger of being subjected to torture upon return to Pakistan. In assessing such a risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant circumstances under article 3, paragraph 2, of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant and mass violations of human rights (paragraph 8.3 of the Decision).
In assessing the risk of torture in the present case, the Committee notes the complainant's allegations that he personally faces a foreseeable and real risk of being persecuted and tortured by the Muslim community or by the authorities or police on account of his Christian faith and activities, since he has already been subjected to harassment, threats and attacks on the basis of for this reason...The Committee takes note of the applicant's allegations that, that he had received threatening letters twice and that he had been assaulted and physically assaulted at least twice because of his religious activities: the first time by three men in August 2011, when he was working on his taxi, and the second time on an unspecified date by four policemen who took him to the police station the area where he was beaten, hung with his feet from the ceiling and pumped water through his nose, after which they falsely accused him of illegal possession of alcoholic beverages. The Committee...Takes note of the State party's statement that its national authorities have concluded that the author's statements are not credible, since, in particular, he only reported to the police about the theft of his car, but did not report receiving a threatening letter. The State party...States that the author made contradictory statements regarding the threatening letter dated January 15, 2010, because at first he said that it was anonymous, but later presented the Council with a letter signed by one religious group and made contradictory statements about how he received it: he first stated that he did not have this letter, but after his application for asylum was rejected, he presented it as evidence, stating that he had left it in the custody of his mother, who forwarded this letter to him (paragraph 8.5 Solutions).
The Committee...Takes note of the applicant's claim that, despite the fact that he showed the Council signs of alleged torture on his body and requested a specialized medical examination to verify whether these injuries were indeed the result of torture, the Council refused to grant him asylum without ordering such an examination. It also takes into account the State party's argument that such an examination was not necessary, since, whatever its outcome, it could not serve as proof that the applicant had been subjected to violence because of his activities in the interests of the Christian organization Jesus Hope for Life and that such an examination would not demonstrate that the danger to the applicant personally in Pakistan will be real at the moment. The Committee...Takes into account the State party's argument that the medical certificate submitted by the applicant does not confirm that he is a victim of torture, since the injuries described in it could have been the result of torture or could have been caused by "many other reasons, such as an accident or war" (paragraph 8.6 of the Decision).
The Committee notes that the fact that the complainant was detained in Pakistan by the police, was subjected to violence and was charged with illegal possession of alcoholic beverages is not disputed. The Committee...Notes that the Council concluded that although the author's statements about the events that he claimed were the basis for granting asylum were consistent, during interviews with the Immigration Service and the Council, he made inconsistent statements regarding the letter dated January 15, 2010, including who signed it and how That's how he got it. The Committee...Takes into account the applicant's claim that he informed the State party's authorities that he could not clearly remember all the details of the events because his memory was damaged as a result of blows to his head during torture and that therefore a different standard of proof should have been applied in his case (paragraph 8.7 of the Decision).
The Committee recalls that, although the complainant has an obligation to provide convincing evidence in support of his asylum application, this does not exempt the State party from making significant efforts to determine whether there are grounds to believe that the complainant would be in danger of being subjected to torture if returned (See K.H. v. Denmark, paragraph 8.8; and F.K. v. Denmark, paragraph 7.6.). In these circumstances, the Committee considers that the complainant has provided the State party's authorities with sufficient material to substantiate his allegations that he was subjected to torture, including medical evidence, so that they can continue to investigate his allegations, in particular by conducting a specialized medical examination. The Committee therefore concludes that, by rejecting the applicant's application for asylum, without attempting to further investigate his claims and without ordering a medical examination, the State party has failed to determine whether there are serious grounds to believe that the applicant would be in danger of being subjected to torture if returned. Accordingly, the Committee concludes that, in the circumstances, the deportation of the applicant to his country of origin would constitute a violation of article 3 of the Convention (paragraph 8.8 of the Decision).
The Committee's conclusions: The State party's expulsion of the applicant to Pakistan would constitute a violation of article 3 of the Convention (paragraph 9 of the Decision).