The case of Sergei Sotnik v. the Russian Federation. Views of the Human Rights Committee of July 23, 2020 on the case. Communication No. 2478/2014.
In 2014, the author of the communication was assisted in the preparation of complaints. Subsequently, the complaint was communicated to the Russian Federation.
As seen from the text of the Views, the author claimed that his rights under article 9, paragraph 1, of the Covenant had been violated. He stated that on 26 May 1999 he had been unlawfully taken into custody in a hospital by police officers who had not produced an arrest warrant and had not informed him of the length of his detention. During his stay in the hospital, he was handcuffed to a bed and was under constant supervision of police officers, who forced him to sign important procedural documents and protocols, including a statement renouncing the right to legal assistance (paragraph 3.3 Considerations).
The Committee's legal position: Arrest or detention may be consistent with domestic law, but nevertheless arbitrary. The concept of "arbitrariness" should not be equated with the concept of "illegality", but should be interpreted more broadly, including elements of unacceptability, injustice, unpredictability and non-observance of procedural guarantees (See the cases: Gorgi-Dinka v. Cameroon (CCPR/C/83/D/1134/2002), paragraph 5.1 Communication No. 305/1988, "Van Alphen v. the Netherlands", paragraph 5.8.), along with elements of expediency, necessity and proportionality. For example, detention in the form of a preventive measure in a criminal case must be reasonable and necessary in all circumstances (See the case Kulov v. Kyrgyzstan (CCPR/C/99/D/1369/2005), paragraph 8.3.). In addition, although the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case in a court of first instance or the court of appeal does not in itself make the previous detention illegal (See cases: communication No. 432/1990, "U.B.E. v. the Netherlands", paragraph 6.5; communication No. 963/2001, "Ueberg v. Australia", paragraph 4.4.), the "unlawful" nature of the arrest or detention may be due to a violation of domestic law or the Covenant itself (paragraph 7.3 of the Views).
The Committee recalls that article 9, paragraph 5, of the Covenant obliges States parties to provide legal grounds for granting compensation as a legally enforceable right and not as a matter that can be decided at the discretion of the authorities. The possibility of obtaining compensation should not be only theoretical, but should be supported by an effective mechanism, and compensation should be paid within a reasonable period of time (paragraph 7.5 of the Considerations).
The Committee's assessment of the factual circumstances of the case: the national courts recognized the lack of evidence that the author was duly notified of the need to appear before the investigator and deliberately evaded appearance, which was confirmed by the court's decision of 3 April 2009. The Committee noted that on both 14 November 2008 and 4 February 2009, the same court decided to detain the author, but did not consider whether the author intended to abscond and whether detention in such circumstances was "reasonable and necessary". In the light of the circumstances described above and in the absence of specific explanations from the domestic courts and the State party, the Committee concluded that the State party had violated the author's rights under article 9, paragraph 1, of the Covenant (paragraph 7.4 of the Views).
The Committee drew attention to the fact that although the national courts accepted the author's claim and examined it, they refused to pay him compensation for the time he spent in custody, based on the conclusion that his detention was "unjustified" but not "illegal". The Committee took note of the court's decision of 3 February 2010, in which the court refused to pay compensation on the grounds that the author did not have a "right to rehabilitation" within the meaning of articles 133 and 134 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation. Therefore, the Committee considered that the court had limited the author's right to compensation, making this right conditional on the existence of grounds for "rehabilitation", which can only be determined by a criminal court. The Committee noted that this shortcoming was not subsequently corrected by higher courts. By demanding the conclusion of the criminal court that there is a right to rehabilitation, the State party makes it impossible, in the absence of a previously positive conclusion, for a person like the author to exercise his right to compensation, which is enforceable. In the light of this finding, and taking into account the Committee's conclusion that the author's detention was indeed arbitrary, the Committee concluded that the State party to the Covenant violated the author's right to a remedy that is enforceable and protected in accordance with article 9, paragraph 5, of the Covenant (paragraph 7.3 of the Views).
The Committee's conclusions: The facts presented testified to a violation of the author's rights under paragraphs 1 and 5 of article 9 of the Covenant.