The case of Rosario Gomez-Limon Pardo v. Spain. Views of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 5 March 2020. Communication No. 52/2018.
In 2018, the authors of the communication were assisted in preparing a complaint. Subsequently, the complaint was communicated to Spain.
In the opinion of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the author was deprived of the opportunity for the proportionality of her eviction to be examined by a judicial or other impartial and independent body authorized to order an end to the violation and provide an effective remedy. The Committee considered that such an examination had not been carried out, and this constituted a violation by the State party of the author's right to housing, established in article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in conjunction with article 2, paragraph 1, of the said international treaty.
As could be seen from the text of the Considerations, the author claimed that her eviction would constitute a violation of article 11 of the Covenant, since she had no other suitable home. The author pointed out that the proposed housing options were not suitable for her: a hostel - because you can only stay in it at night, and a nursing home is also not suitable, because entry and exit stop after 20.00. The author also drew attention to the fact that due to her age and health status, these options are even less suitable for her, since on October 9, 2012, she was diagnosed with cancer, and on October 2, 2015, she was recognized as having a disability of 41%. At the time of registration of the message, she was awaiting oncological surgery scheduled for October 2018. In addition, the author explained that she could not live in the house, which she owns as common property with her husband, who lives in it, and she is afraid of being subjected to violence again.
Information about this case is presented in the Review of the Practice of Interstate Bodies for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms No. 5 (2020) prepared by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. Posted on the official website of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation in the subsection "International practice" for 2020 in the section "Documents". Access mode: URL: http://www.vsrf.ru/documents/international_practice/29077 /.
The Committee's assessment of the factual circumstances of the case: it was established that the author had lived all her life in the house rented by her parents in 1963, and continued to live in it and pay rent after the death of her parents. In 1982, the author acquired a house with her husband, with whom they lived separately, and at the time of the events in question, the husband occupied this house, which was in his exclusive use, although under the terms of the separation agreement, both spouses retained joint ownership and use of the house. The author was subjected to gender-based violence and reported it to her clinic and social welfare authorities. In addition, she had a disability of 41%. On April 30, 2013, the landlord filed a lawsuit against the author of the message to evict her. On February 20, 2014, the court of first instance declared the lease of the house terminated. This decision was confirmed in the second instance by the Provincial Court of Madrid and appealed to the Supreme Court of Spain on September 20, 2017. On March 12, 2018, the court of first instance ordered the author to vacate the house on May 16, 2018. The first time the eviction was suspended due to an administrative error, and the second time due to the support of several citizens protesting in front of the author's house. The author applied for a stay of eviction after receiving notification of each eviction order, claiming that she had no other accommodation. On 14 May 2018, the author submitted an application for social housing (paragraph 7.2 of the Considerations).
The author was evicted after the termination of the lease agreement by the court of first instance by a decision confirmed in the second and cassation instances. The author did not claim that she did not enjoy procedural guarantees, and it did not follow from the information provided to the Committee that this process was arbitrary (paragraph 9.1 of the Views).
The author did not vacate the house and continued to live in it, so the court of first instance decided to evict her. The Committee noted the State party's contention that the claim of the owner of the property, an individual, should be taken into account. The judicial authorities decided to terminate the lease agreement after a trial, in which the author did not claim that her procedural rights had not been respected. The Committee considered that there was a legitimate reason that could justify the author's eviction (paragraph 9.2 of the Views).
The Committee noted that the court rejected the author's request for a stay of eviction, where she reported her situation of special economic vulnerability and her lack of other housing. In rejecting the request to suspend the eviction, the court of first instance did not consider the question of proportionality between the legitimate purpose of the eviction and its consequences for the evicted (paragraph 9.3 of the Considerations).
The Committee stressed that the State party's authorities had invited the author to apply for a place in a home for people who are able to support themselves, in a shared apartment for the elderly or in a shared home, and that she had rejected these options because they were not suitable for her in her situation (paragraph 9.6 of the Views).
The Committee concluded that, in the circumstances of the present case and in the light of all the documentation provided to it, the author was deprived of the opportunity for the proportionality of her eviction to be examined by an impartial and independent body with the authority to order the termination of the violation. The Committee considered that such an examination had not been carried out, and this constituted a violation by the State party of the author's right to housing, as set out in article 11 of the Covenant in conjunction with article 2, paragraph 1 (paragraph 9.7 of the Views).
The Committee noted: "following the events described in this communication, the State party has adopted new legislation according to which the court is obliged to inform the social security authorities about the eviction of persons in a vulnerable situation, and if the social security authorities determine the vulnerability of persons against whom an eviction order has been issued, the court has the right to suspend the eviction so that the social security authorities they could provide assistance for up to one month, or three months if the claim was filed by a legal entity. This legislation could have prevented such violations of the right to housing as set out in the present Considerations and could have been useful in restoring the applicant's position" (paragraph 9.8 of the Considerations).
The Committee indicated that on 17 October 2018, the author was evicted, despite the Committee's request for temporary interim measures and without providing other suitable housing. In the absence of an explanation from the State party of the reasons why interim measures could not be taken, the Committee concluded that, in the circumstances of the present case, the State party had violated article 5 of the Optional Protocol (paragraph 10.3 of the Views).
The Committee's conclusions: The State party violated the author's right to an effective remedy under article 11, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, in conjunction with article 2, paragraph 1, and in accordance with the requirements of article 4. The Committee also considered that the State party violated article 5 of the Optional Protocol (paragraph 12 of the Views).